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ORIGINALISM, PRECEDENT, AND 
CANDOR 
David A. Strauss* 
I 
Some legal principles are purely conventional. Within a 
wide range of possible rules, it doesn't matter much what the 
rule is; we just have to have a rule. "Traffic keeps to the right" is 
a customary example. But other legal principles are not just con-
ventional. Some alternatives are much better than others. If the 
question is whether religious minorities should be subject to per-
secution or whether battery should be a tort, it is not enough just 
to have a rule. Legal principles addressing questions of that kind 
are unavoidably based on judgments about morality, social pol-
icy, and similar matters. You can't have a system of tort law, or a 
system of religious freedom, or many other things that the law 
provides, without making such judgments. 
The controversy arises over the question: who should make 
those judgments? When the issue is one of constitutional law, 
originalism, as I understand it at least, provides a clear answer: 
those judgments were authoritatively made by the Framers of 
the Constitution. Originalists have to say who counts as the 
Framers, and they have to have a way of ascertaining what 
judgments that group made, but for present purposes those are 
details, and I will assume that originalists have an adequate way 
of doing both those things. The point is that according to 
originalism, the interpreter does not make controversial judg-
ments about morality and policy; his or her job is to implement 
the judgments made by someone else. There may be versions of 
originalism that are more equivocal on this point, but at least in 
its purest and most comprehensive form, originalism allows no 
room, at all, for the interpreter to make such judgments. Indeed 
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I thank the Son-
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that seems to be the source of much of the appeal, implicit and 
explicit, of originalism. 
Precedent-based or common law approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation are different because they allow for the in-
terpreter, within a certain range, to be influenced by judgments 
about morality, policy, fairness, and similar concerns. No sensi-
ble common law approach denies this. Maybe Christopher Co-
lumbus Langdell thought that precedents constitute a closed 
axiomatic system from which legal outcomes could be deduced 
on every occasion, but no one else thinks that. Benjamin Car-
dozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process, as good a candidate as 
any for a canonical statement of the common law method, is ex-
plicit in recognizing the role that judgments of morality and pol-
icy play in a precedent-based system.1 Unlike originalism, a 
precedent-based approach does not deny that the moral judg-
ments of the interpreter-not just the judge, but the legislator, 
President, or citizen who takes a position on a constitutional is-
sue-are sometimes a legitimate part of constitutional interpre-
tation. 
What a precedent-based system does is to define and limit 
the role that such judgments play. Originalists often criticize 
precedent-based approaches on the ground that they impose 
only a nominal limit, not a real limit, on the use of the judge's 
moral and policy judgments. I think that is manifestly incorrect: 
many constitutional principles that are morally appealing are 
simply off limits, because of precedent. No judge, however con-
vinced of the immorality of, say, the war in Iraq, or the most re-
cent set of tax cuts, would seriously consider holding them un-
constitutional. Precedent sets the terms of debate in countless 
areas of constitutional law. Precedent limits judges in constitu-
tional cases just as it has for a long time limited judges in cases 
about contracts, torts, and property. 
The important point, though, is that an originalist must deny 
that he or she is moved at all by the moral attractiveness of a po-
sition. A common law constitutionalist can forthrightly acknowl-
edge that part of the reason for adopting a certain view is that 
that view is morally right. The immorality of Jim Crow segrega-
tion may not be sufficient to sustain the lawfulness of Brown v. 
Board of Education,2 but at least its relevance is not zero, no 
1. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67 
(1921). 
2. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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matter what the original understanding was. An originalist can-
not say that. Originalists must insist that all they are doing is im-
plementing judgments made by someone else-the Framers, 
somehow defined. 
In my view this contrast is a very strong point in favor of 
common law constitutionalism and against originalism. That is so 
for many reasons, but the reason I want to emphasize here is 
that the common law approach is more candid. Judgments about 
morality and social policy in fact play a role in originalist consti-
tutional interpretation, too. One great advantage of a precedent-
based approach to constitutional interpretation is that it is can-
did about those influences in a way originalism is not. A person 
committed to a common-law approach can forthrightly avow the 
moral and policy judgments underlying his or her views. Those 
judgments will then have to be defended on their own terms, as 
moral or policy judgments; and the interpreter will have to give 
an explanation of why he or she is not simply imposing a moral 
judgment but is acting lawfully. 
An originalist cannot admit that his or her moral judgments 
are entering into the picture. As a result, those judgments, when 
they play a role in the originalist's interpretations-and they will 
play a role, sometimes-will do so covertly. The originalist will 
have to deny that he or she is making any moral judgments at all, 
and will therefore not have to defend them in terms, or explain 
why relying on those judgments is a legitimate thing to do in the 
particular case. The originalist has to say that all the judgments 
were made by someone else, by James Madison or John Bing-
ham or the members of state ratifying conventions at some dis-
tant time in the past. And James Madison's judgments, accord-
ing to originalists, are not to be challenged on grounds of 
morality or policy. That is, it seems to me, an unhealthy way of 
dealing with difficult constitutional issues. 
II 
In saying that originalism is less than candid, I am not-at 
all- attributing bad faith to originalists. The problem is not with 
the people practicing originalism; the problem is a structural fea-
ture of the originalist approach to interpretation. I also am not 
darning that accounts of the original understanding of constitu-
tional provisions are always or necessarily influenced by moral 
and policy judgments. Sometimes the original understandings 
will be so clear that there can be only one possible outcome of a 
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conscientious effort to uncover them, or at least so I will assume. 
But sometimes they will not be so clear. This can happen for a 
variety of well-known reasons:3 as a practical matter, the histori-
cal materials may be sparse, vague, conflicting, or simply un-
enlightening; even when those difficulties do not arise, if the 
constitutional provision in issue was adopted long ago, there is 
the problem of coming to grips with a culture that is very differ-
ent from ours; there is then the related problem of characterizing 
the original understanding in a way that bears on current issues; 
and, related to that, the notorious difficulty of determining the 
level of generality at which to characterize the original under-
standing. 
When problems like these occur, the original understand-
ings will not be so clear. In such instances, it will be difficult even 
for good-faith interpreters to keep their moral and policy views 
on the sidelines. In fact there is a useful parallel, on this score, 
between originalism and the common law approach. Sometimes 
there is only one fair reading of the precedents; a good faith ef-
fort to follow precedent can yield only one result. Sometimes the 
precedents are not completely clear, but, on balance, one read-
ing is certainly better; the same might be true of original under-
standings. But sometimes the precedents-or the evidence of the 
original understandings-simply does not admit of a single good-
faith interpretation. In those circumstances, the common law ap-
proach says that the interpreter's moral and policy judgments 
can play a role. But an originalist (in the versions I am consider-
ing) cannot say that. In those circumstances, the tendency to see 
in history what one wants to see may be unconscious but will be 
very strong. 
This happens, frequently, even with historians, whose de-
bates usually have relatively low stakes as a practical matter. 
Take, for example, the question of Thomas Jefferson's attitude 
toward slavery, surely one of the more thoroughly examined 
questions in American historiography. Was Jefferson basically a 
critic of slavery, who made limited compromises with the politi-
cal and economic reality of his time, or was he basically an 
apologist for slavery who voiced the occasional high-sounding 
sentiment against it? Or did his views change over the course of 
his life? Distinguished historians can be found on every side of 
this question. And, not surprisingly, those whose antecedent dis-
3. These are admirably recounted in Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare De-
cisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005). 
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position toward Jefferson was generally favorable tend to por-
tray him as an opponent of slavery; those whose disposition was 
initially more critical tend toward the opposite view. There is no 
reason to believe this is in any way the product of bad faith or of 
anything less than a conscientious effort to understand the his-
torical materials. But there is a tendency-not inexorable, not 
present in every instance, but an undeniable tendency- to see in 
history what one would like to see. 
In the law, one of the most prominent examples of this 
comes from what is, to my mind, one of the greatest judicial 
opinions, Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. Califor-
nia.5 That opinion, better than any other, "captures why the 
freedom of speech might be considered the linchpin of the 
American constitutional regime. "6 It is an eloquent and in some 
ways brilliant account of the value of free expression. But 
Brandeis attributed the central ideas to "[t]hose who won our 
independence."7 The problem is that it is not at all clear that 
"those who won our independence" shared Justice Brandeis's 
views, or our views, about freedom of expression (leaving aside 
the question whether "those who won our independence" are 
the relevant Framers of the Constitution). There is actually a lot 
of controversy, and uncertainty, about the Framers' views on 
even the basic question of whether the government could punish 
dissent on the ground that it undermined civic cohesion.8 
Brandeis (and the historians on whom he relied) saw in history 
what they wanted to see.9 
4. For various views of Jefferson, see, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: 
Treason Against the Hopes of the World, in PeterS. Onuf, ed., Jeffersonian Legacies 181-
221 (1993) (critical of Jefferson); Douglas L. Wilson, Thomas Jefferson and the Character 
Issue, CCLXX Atlantic Monthly 61 (1992) (defending Jefferson); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, 
AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171--80, 313-26 (1997) 
(describing evolution in Jefferson's views). See generally JoHN CHEsTER MILLER, THE 
WOLF BY TIIE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY (1977). 
5. 274 U.S. 357,375-76 (1927). 
6. Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the 
Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN TIIE MODERN ERA 60, 73 (Lee C. 
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). 
7. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. 
8. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE 
OF A FREE PRESS (1985); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a 
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); David M. Rabban: The Ahistorical 
Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 795 (1985). 
9. Brandeis is commonly thought to have been influenced by Zechariah Chafee 
Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932 (1919). For a characterization 
of Chafee's article as "disingenuous," see Rabban, supra note 8, 37 STAN. L. REV. at 796 
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Finally, there are the ingenious and intellectually adept ef-
forts to find an originalist justification for Brown v. Board of 
Education.10 For a long time, the nearly unanimous view has 
been that Brown is inconsistent with the original understandings 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The evidence-from debates 
over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, which it constitutionalized; from the practices in states that 
ratified the Amendment, as well as the legislation and practices 
of the Congress that proposed it; and from judicial decisions in-
terpreting the Amendment in the period after it was ratified-
seems conclusive.11 
Today, a half-century after the decision, some originalists 
claim to have found an originalist defense of Brown. It would be 
one thing if these new originalist defenders of Brown claimed 
simply that the original understanding was vague and inconclu-
sive, and not unequivocally opposed to Brown. That was, in fact, 
the view taken by many of Brown's defenders at the time of the 
decision.12 But if the original understanding is inconclusive, then 
there is no originalist justification for Brown; something besides 
the original understanding is needed to condemn school segrega-
tion. The originalists who would justify Brown claim, if I under-
stand them correctly, that Brown is not just reconcilable with but 
dictated by the original understanding- that the text and the his-
torical materials, uninfluenced by any moral judgments about 
Jim Crow, re~uire the conclusion that school segregation is un-
constitutional. 3 
As an aside, even if this conclusion were right-perhaps es-
pecially if it is right-what it would actually demonstrate is that 
originalism, even if sound in theory, is terrible in practice. In 
June 1953, after hearing argument in Brown for the first time, 
n.2. 
10. I have in mind principally Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegre-
gation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995). The defense offered by Akhil Reed Amar, 
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 60--65 (2000), seems 
to rely on the text of the Constitution, rather than the original understandings, and ar-
guably on (certainly correct) moral judgments about the nature of racial segregation as 
well. 
11. Among the leading accounts are Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Alfred Avins, De Facto 
and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light On the Fourteenth Amendment 
from the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 MISS. L.J. 179 (1967); RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (1977). 
12. See Bickel, supra note 11. 
13. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 10, 81 VA. L. REv. at 1140 ("[S]chool segrega-
tion was understood during Reconstruction to violate the principles of equality of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
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the Supreme Court called for rebriefing and reargument on, 
among other things, the question whether the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the Amend-
ment "would abolish segregation in public schools." That sum-
mer, many of the best lawyers and the best historians in the 
nation worked feverishly to try to prove that the answer to that 
question was "yes." They had every incentive to find that an-
swer. More important, the Court, when it ultimately wrote its 
opinion in Brown, in May, 1954, had every incentive to claim 
that it had found a favorable answer, if that conclusion could 
possibly be supported by the evidence. The Court knew that its 
decision would be met with hostility, and if there was a way to 
claim the authority of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court would surely have claimed it. 
But the Court made no such claim; famously, its opinion es-
sentially conceded that the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not support the conclusion it reached in 
Brown. In other words, with every incentive, and substantial re-
sources, the best lawyers and best historians of the time could 
not identify an originalist argument for Brown that was plausible 
enough to be used even by a Court with every incentive to use 
such an argument. 
The originalist defenders of Brown are, therefore, saying 
that on the most important constitutional issue of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court, aided by the best lawyers and histo-
rians in the country, failed to uncover the original understand-
ing-even though there was every possible incentive to uncover 
it. It took another half-century, and some brilliant historical 
analysis, finally to get the original understanding correct. If it 
was that hard to arrive at the right originalist answer in Brown, 
then what hope is there for judges and advocates in more ordi-
nary cases dealing with one among many issues on a busy 
docket? No one has suggested that the original understandings 
about school segregation are more difficult to uncover than the 
original understandings about most other constitutional issues. If 
the originalist defenders of Brown are right, it is, evidently, very 
hard-very, very hard-to do originalism correctly, and very 
easy to be mistaken about the original understandings. Any in-
terpretive method that is that difficult to apply, and that mis-
take-prone, merits rejection for that reason alone. 
But my principal point here is different. I do not think it is 
plausible to say that the original understandings compel the con-
clusion that Brown is correct. There is too much evidence to the 
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contrary, including the fact that the Court was unable to come 
up with a plausible originalist defense when it desperately 
needed one. The original understandings about school segrega-
tion may have been confused or equivocal-that is certainly very 
plausible. Or-and this is the real point-it might be possible to 
sift through the textual and historical evidence and make a case 
for Brown. But that, I believe, is what the originalist defenders 
of Brown have done. They have made a case. They have shown 
(at most) that, if you need to find some not-totally-implausible 
way to square Brown with the textual and historical evidence, 
you can. If you minimize the evidence against Brown, and make 
the most of the favorable evidence-in the manner of an expert 
brief-writer-you can come up with a defense of Brown that a 
Justice who wanted to hold school segregation unlawful could 
adopt without embarrassment. But that is quite different from 
showing that the original understandings dictate Brown. The dif-
ference is, precisely, whether the interpreter's moral condemna-
tion of school segregation is playing a role in describing the 
original understandings. 
There may be nothing intrinsically wrong with using history 
in this way-showing that a particular outcome, preferable on 
moral grounds, can be reconciled with history even if it is not 
compelled by history. In fact, this form of originalism is parallel 
to (it may even be a variety of) common law interpretation. It 
amounts to using the history of the framing in the way that 
common lawyers use precedent. Common lawyers allow for the 
possibility that precedent can sometimes be read in different 
ways; when it can, they choose one way because of its superiority 
as a matter of morality or policy. Similarly, the originalist de-
fenders of Brown (and of the central principles of modern First 
Amendment law, and of much else) are choosing one among 
many possible readings of history because of the moral attrac-
tiveness of that reading. But common law approaches (of any 
sophistication) admit that that is what they are doing; originalists 
insist that they are just unearthing someone else's moral judg-
ments, not making their own. 
III 
Why, it might finally be asked, can't originalism be defined 
to permit moral judgments to play a role? Two such accounts of 
originalism seem to be available. On one account, originalism 
just requires that clear original understandings be honored; to 
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the extent the original understanding is unclear, originalism has 
nothing to say.14 That conception of originalism certainly reduces 
the likelihood that the analysis of original understandings will be 
influenced by the interpreter's moral or policy views. But it does 
not reduce the likelihood to zero; there will still be a temptation 
to find that the original understandings are clear, when in fact 
they are not. And this conception of originalism, if practiced 
faithfully, would, of course, give away a lot. Exactly how much 
would depend on how clear is clear. But it seems likely that most 
controversial constitutional issues would, according to this view, 
require non-originalist answers. 
Alternatively, originalism might be conceived as a kind of 
alloy of historical materials and moral or policy judgments. Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, who considers himself an originalist, ac-
knowledges that "originalism is strong medicine, and . . . one 
cannot realistically expect judges (probably myself included) to 
apply it without a trace of constitutional perfectionism."15 But, 
he suggests, this may even be a virtue: 
[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion-or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any 
law-is that the judges will mistake their own predilections 
for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a 
conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever suc-
ceeds entirely .... 
Originalism [unlike nonoriginalism] does not aggravate th[is] 
principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a historical 
criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the prefer-
ences of the judge himself. And the principal defect of that 
approach-that historical research is always difficult and 
sometimes inconclusive-will, unlike nonoriginalism, lead to a 
more moderate rather than a more extreme result. The inevi-
table tendency of judges to think that the law is what they 
would like it to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in 
judicial historiography to be made in the direction of project-
!4. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical 
as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005), appears to take this position, but for two 
reasons I am reluctant to attribute it to him unequivocally. First, Professor Barnett 
speaks of "original meaning" rather than original understandings, and, given the prob-
le~ati~ nature of the notion of "meaning," that may be an important difference. Second, 
while It Is clear that Professor Barnett would permit precedent to play a role if the origi-
nal mearung were unclear, I am not certain about the role he would assign to judgments 
of morality and policy. 
15. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 863 
(1989). • 
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ing upon the age of 1789 current, modern values-so that as 
applied, even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will 
(as the historical record shows) end up as something of a 
compromise. Perhaps not a bad characteristic for a constitu-
. 1 h 16 tiona t eory. 
At least two things about this passage are notable. First, it is 
an admission, from perhaps the most prominent originalist of all, 
that originalists inevitably meld their historical inquiries with 
their own moral judgments (and that one need not attribute bad 
faith to originalists in saying that). In fact Justice Scalia thinks 
"the historical record shows" that originalists do this. Second, 
Justice Scalia does not suggest that, in particular cases, this "in-
evitable" tendency should be acknowledged so that it can be 
weighed against and made coherent with the historical investiga-
tion of original understandings. Instead, he seems to be saying 
that, despite his admission, in particular controversies original-
ists will claim simply to be following the original understandings, 
even though they know that they are, to some degree, actually 
being influenced by their own moral and policy judgments. At 
the same time, some originalists at least will be lacerating their 
opponents for doing openly what they are doing covertly. 
The idea that judges and other interpreters of the Constitu-
tion should not simply follow their own judgments, and should 
instead seek guidance from the wisdom of others-that is an ex-
cellent idea, a counsel of humility. It is also the core of the com-
mon law approach. Of course, the common law approach looks 
to a wider variety of sources of wisdom-not just the Framers, 
but subsequent generations who wrestled with the same prob-
lems. To me that seems sensible; why should one think that the 
Framers (however defined) had all the answers? But that is not 
the present point; the present point is the simply the greater 
candor of the common law approach. Rather than purporting 
simply to implement the original understandings, all the while 
knowing that in fact one is skewing them toward one's own 
views, why not acknowledge openly that one's own views play a 
role, and then give an account of just what role they should play? 
There is one final point. Humility and candor go hand in 
hand, and originalism is, too often, an unhumble way of trying to 
claim the high ground. We originalists are following the true 
constitution, while non-originalist judges essentially just do what 
they want-that is often the motif. Of course not all originalists 
16. /d. at 863-M. 
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engage in this kind of rhetoric-far from it-and devotees of 
other methods certainly have their own forms of annoying self-
congratulation. But originalists have been known, on occasion, 
to pose as the present-day vicars of the Founding generation, 
and that pose would not be available to them if there were a 
greater degree of candor about the aspects of their approach-
such as the influence of the interpreter's moral and policy judg-
ments-that originalists, covertly, share with common law con-
stitutionalists. 
